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	<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3/tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-</id>
	<updated>2009-11-03T20:01:39Z</updated>
	<title>Comments for Why derivatives are your friends</title>
	
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	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009</id>
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		<link rel="service.edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/mt-42/mt-atom.cgi/weblog/blog_id=3/entry_id=7009" title="Why derivatives are your friends" />
		<published>2009-03-27T14:09:22Z</published>
		<updated>2009-03-27T14:49:17Z</updated>
		<title>Why derivatives are your friends</title>
		<summary>With all the accusations of excessive speculation on Wall Street, the media has certainly done its fair share of speculation as to what goes on in the structured finance market. And given all the public outrage, this is information the...</summary>
		<author>
			<name>Charles Davi</name>
			<uri>http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com</uri>
		</author>
		
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			<![CDATA[<p>With all the accusations of excessive speculation on Wall Street,
the media has certainly done its fair share of speculation as to what
goes on in the structured finance market. And given all the public
outrage, this is information the press should should get straight
before they report.</p><br /><p>Like every trade, the world of structured finance has developed its
own little language describing the things that people in the market
do. The first step to understanding that language is building a
vocabulary. I would say that most folks in the media have developed to
the point where they can identify, point at, and grunt towards objects
in the structured finance space. But it's not just the media that
doesn't understand structured finance. It's economists, <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f21ae14-198a-11de-9d34-0000779fd2ac.html" mce_href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f21ae14-198a-11de-9d34-0000779fd2ac.html" target="_blank">pundits</a>, and perhaps most ironic, financiers!&nbsp; Even that giant of finance, George Soros has <a href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2009/02/09/surely-youre-joking-mr-soros/" mce_href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2009/02/09/surely-youre-joking-mr-soros/" target="_blank">loused up explanations of how credit default swaps work</a>. I've called out <a href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/12/10/thats-certainly-not-why-credit-default-swaps/" mce_href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/12/10/thats-certainly-not-why-credit-default-swaps/" target="_blank">economists</a> in the past for their mumblings on credit default swaps and the like, and so has <a href="http://meganmcardle.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/03/institutional_investment.php" mce_href="http://meganmcardle.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/03/institutional_investment.php" target="_blank">Megan McArdle</a>.
This is a serious problem because economists, finance giants, and the
like command a level of authority that my local TV news anchor does not.</p>]]>
			<![CDATA[<br /><p>Continuing in the tradition of misinformation, it appears Hernando
De Soto has joined the ranks of economists who demonstrate a complete
lack of understanding of the subject area. But rather than devote an
entire article to bashing an intelligent man, I've decided to use the
errors in his <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123793811398132049.html#mod=rss_opinion_main" mce_href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123793811398132049.html#mod=rss_opinion_main" target="_blank">opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal</a>
as the first step in exploring the world of structured finance for
those (lucky) folks who have hitherto had little exposure to the area.</p><br /><p><b>Speaking Structured Finance</b></p><br /><p>Speaking "Structured Finance" is not as hard as those around you
suggest. Sure, these are not ideas and terms you've grown up around.
But with a bit of reading and thinking, you'll be the star of your next
wine and cheese night. In this article, I provide topical treatment of
a wide range of subjects, but provide links for those brave souls
who really want to dive in and impress their cheese-eating friends.</p><br /><p>First, Mortgage Backed Securities are not derivatives. To my fellow
finance wonks, this may be a trivial observation. But apparently Mr. De
Soto was not aware of this distinction:</p>
<blockquote><p>[A]ggressive financiers have manufactured what the Bank
for International Settlements estimates to be $1 quadrillion worth of
new derivatives (mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt
obligations, and credit default swaps) that have flooded the market.</p></blockquote><br /><p>A Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) is just that, a security and not a
derivative. Investors that own MBSs receive regular income from these
securities. What distinguishes them from traditional securities, such
as corporate bonds, is that the MBS is backed by a pool of mortgages.
That is, investors buy MBSs, and as a result, they have a right to the
cash flows produced by that pool of mortgages. As the homeowners whose
mortgages are in the pool pay off their mortgages, the money gets
funneled to and split up among the MBS holders. In effect, MBSs offer
investors the opportunity to finance a portion of each mortgage in the
pool and receive a portion of the returns on the pool.&nbsp; For more on
MBS, go <a href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/10/30/securitization-demystified/" mce_href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/10/30/securitization-demystified/" target="_blank">here</a>.</p><br /><p>Similarly, a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) is not a
derivative, but a security. It is similar in concept to an MBS, except
the pool is not made up of mortgages, but rather various debt
instruments, such as corporate bonds.&nbsp; The pool underlying the CDO
could be made up of loans, in which case it's referred to as a
Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO). In general, a CDO has a pool of
assets that generate cash. As that cash is generated, it gets funneled
to and split up among the investors. For more on CDOs, go <a href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/12/03/synthetic-cdos-ratings-and-super-senior-tranches-part-1/" mce_href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/12/03/synthetic-cdos-ratings-and-super-senior-tranches-part-1/" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/12/01/tranches-and-risk/" mce_href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/12/01/tranches-and-risk/" target="_blank">here</a>.</p><br /><p>A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a derivative. So De Soto got 1 out of
3. Well then, what's a derivative? A "derivative" is a bilateral
contract where the value of the contract is derived from some other
security, derivative, index, or measurable event. For example, a <i>call option</i>
to buy common stock is a fairly well known and common derivative. A
call option grants the option holder the right (they can do it) but not
the obligation to buy common stock at a predetermined price. The person
who sold the option has the obligation (they must do it) and not the
right to sell common stock at that predetermined price. So the value of
a call option that entitles the holder to buy 100 shares of ABC Co. at
$10 per share would depend on the current price of ABC's stock. If ABC
is trading above $10, it would be worth something to the holder,
a.k.a., "in the money." If it's trading below $10, it would be "out of
the money."</p><br /><p>So what are OTC Derivatives? The term "OTC" means "over the
counter." The spirit of the term comes from the fact that OTC
Derivatives are not traded on an exchange, but entered into directly
between the two parties. "Swaps" are a type of OTC Derivative. And the
Interest Rate Swap market is by far the largest corner of the OTC Swap
market, despite media protestations as to the size of the CDS market.
For more an Interest Rate Swaps, go <a href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/10/27/derivativessynthetic-instruments-demystified/" mce_href="http://derivativedribble.wordpress.com/2008/10/27/derivativessynthetic-instruments-demystified/" target="_blank">here</a>.</p><br /><p>Despite the fact that the Interest Rate Swap market is an order of
magnitude larger than the CDS market, we will succumb to media pressure
and skip right past Interest Rate Swaps and onto the most senselessly
notorious OTC Derivative of all: the Credit Default Swap.</p><br /><p><b>What Did You Just Agree To?</b></p><br /><p>Under a typical CDS, the <i>protection buyer</i>,<i> </i>B, agrees to make regular payments, usually quarterly, to the <i>protection seller</i>, D. The amount of the quarterly payments, called the <i>swap fee</i>, will be a percentage of the <i>notional amount</i>
of their agreement. The term notional amount is simply a label for an
amount agreed upon by the parties, the significance of which will
become clear as we move on. So what does B get in return for his
generosity? That depends on the type of CDS, but for now we will assume
that we are dealing with what is called <i>physical delivery</i>. Under physical delivery, if the reference entity <i>defaults</i>, D agrees to (i) accept delivery of certain bonds issued by the <i>reference entity </i>named
in the CDS and (ii) pay the notional amount in cash to B. After a
default, the agreement terminates and no one makes any more payments.
If default never occurs, the agreement terminates on some scheduled
date. The reference entity could be any entity that has debt
obligations.</p><br /><p>Now let's fill in some concrete facts to make things less abstract.
Let's assume the reference entity is ABC. And let's assume that the
notional amount is $100 million and that the swap fee is at a rate of
8% per annum, or $2,000,000 per quarter. Finally, assume that B and D
executed their agreement on January 1, 2009 and that B made its first
payment on April 1, 2009.&nbsp; When July 1, 2009 rolls along, B will make
another $2,000,000 payment. This will go on and on for the life of the
agreement, unless ABC triggers a default under the CDS. While there are
a myriad of ways to trigger a default under a CDS, we consider only the
most basic scenario in which a default occurs: ABC fails to make a
payment on one of its bonds. If that happens, we switch into D's
obligations under the CDS. As mentioned above, D has to accept delivery
of certain bonds issued by ABC (exactly which bonds are acceptable will
be determined by the agreement) and in exchange D must pay B $100
million.</p><br /><p><b>Why Would You Do Such A Thing?</b></p><br /><p>To answer that, we must first observe that there are two
possibilities for B's state of affairs before ABC's default: he either
(i) owned ABC issued bonds or (ii) he did not. I know, very <a href="http://farm1.static.flickr.com/203/497138671_de256d7780.jpg?v=0" mce_href="http://farm1.static.flickr.com/203/497138671_de256d7780.jpg?v=0">Zen</a>.
Let's assume that B owned $100 million worth of ABC's bonds. If ABC
defaults, B gives D his bonds and receives his $100 million in
principal (the notional amount). If ABC doesn't default, B pays
$2,000,000 per quarter over the life of the agreement and collects his
$100 million in principal from the bonds when the bonds mature. So in
either case, B gets his principal. As a result, he has fully hedged his
principal. So, for anyone who owns the underlying bond, a CDS will
allow them to protect the principal on that bond in exchange for
sacrificing some of the yield on that bond.</p><br /><p>Now let's assume that B didn't own the bond. If ABC defaults, B has
to go out and buy $100 million par value of ABC bonds. Because ABC just
defaulted, that's going to cost a lot less than $100 million. Let's say
it costs B $50 million to buy ABC issued bonds with a par value of $100
million. B is going to deliver these bonds to D and receive $100
million. That leaves B with a profit of $50 million. Outstanding. But
what if ABC doesn't default? In that case, B has to pay out $2,000,000
per quarter for the life of the agreement and receives nothing. So, a
CDS allows someone who doesn't own the underlying bond to short the
bond.</p><br /><p>So why would D enter into a CDS?&nbsp; Most of the big <i>swap dealers</i>
buy and sell protection and pocket the difference. But, D
doesn't have to be a dealer. D could sell protection without entering
into an offsetting transaction. In that case, he has gone long on the
underlying bond. That is, he has almost the same cash flows as someone
who owns the bond. So a CDS allows someone who doesn't own the bond to
gain bond-like credit exposure to the reference entity.</p><br /><p>I will follow this article up with another elaborating further on why derivatives are used and why they are your friends.</p><p><br /></p> ]]>
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	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169183</id>
		<thr:in-reply-to ref="tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php"/>
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		<title>Comment from charlescolinB on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>charlescolinB</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>This guy is too smart for the rest of us.  I only understood up to where he wrote "structured finance market" in the first sentence.  I gave up shortly after that.</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T16:02:45Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169224</id>
		<thr:in-reply-to ref="tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php"/>
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		<title>Comment from Winston Chang on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>Winston Chang</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>In general derivatives aren't that hard to understand in terms of how they work. What is hard is pricing and valuing them. People often use the pricing complexities as an excuse to pretend that these instruments are "too hard for you to understand" when, in reality, the instruments themselves are quite simple. </p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T17:13:41Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169236</id>
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		<title>Comment from Brock C. on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>Brock C.</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>I find it's easiest to call derivatives "'as if' contracts." You have the same economic impact "as if" you were long a stock, or "as if" you had lent someone money at Libor+3%, or "as if" you had shorted Citibank CDS paper.</p>

<p>But they are not your friends. Warren Buffet understands this. Derivatives do not allow you to actually be long or short the underlying security, you're just getting paid "as if" you were long or short the position for as long as your counter-party (and each of their counter-parties) is solvent. But once one person on the chain of offsetting transactions goes belly up the whole chain breaks and everyone falls. And you have no way of knowing who else on the chain except for your immediate counter-parties.</p>

<p>Derivatives are tool for avoiding regulation. That's it. They're a way to short stock without having to obey short sale rules, or to sell insurance without having to be a regulated insurance company. They call a rose by a different name and *presto*, avoid the regulators. <b>We have these regulators for a reason</b>.  They're far from perfect, but our institutional memory tells us that they are necessary to minimize the creation of systemic risks.</p>

<p>It might be nice to think that we can allow "the big boys" who are sophisticated and know what they're getting into to opt out of regulatory schemes if they want to, but clearly their failures (when sufficiently large) effect the rest of us. We can't allow this to continue.</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T17:35:54Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169256</id>
		<thr:in-reply-to ref="tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php"/>
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		<title>Comment from John on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>John</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>I'm sorry, but you're just splitting hairs.  A derivative is any instrument that derives it's value from something else.  All the instruments you describe derive their value from either a pool of mortgages, or a pool of bonds, etc.  And THAT MAKES THEM A DERIVATIVE.  Stop making a point that is meaningless.  The point is that these idiotic instruments were created to satisfy greed, not to produce anything of real value.  Like weather futures!  How ridiculous is that!</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T18:15:25Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169261</id>
		<thr:in-reply-to ref="tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php"/>
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		<title>Comment from Derivative Dribble on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>Derivative Dribble</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>John,</p>

<p>A derivative is a bilateral contract. MBS and CDO are securities, backed by assets, that bind multiple parties. There is a world of difference between the two.</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T18:27:22Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169264</id>
		<thr:in-reply-to ref="tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php"/>
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		<title>Comment from Derivative Dribble on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>Derivative Dribble</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>Brock C.,</p>

<p>First, OTC Derivatives existed long before they were exempted from regulation. </p>

<p>Second, CDS contracts are not insurance. There are collateral, aka margin, features that make the instrument closest to a forward contract than anything else in nature. I left this out because I didn't want to complicate an otherwise simple introduction. I will discuss the issue further in the follow up post.<br />
</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T18:33:44Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169292</id>
		<thr:in-reply-to ref="tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php"/>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php#comment-169292" />
		<title>Comment from Winston Chang on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>Winston Chang</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>Weather futures do have legitimate uses. Farmers can use them to hedge against weather-induced poor harvests. What you're saying is like saying life insurance is stupid because "you're betting someone you'll die, and you're hoping you'll lose." (I think that was Richard Pryor).</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T19:40:19Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169298</id>
		<thr:in-reply-to ref="tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php"/>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/03/how_to_speak_structured_finance.php#comment-169298" />
		<title>Comment from Winston Chang on 2009-03-27</title>
		<author>
				<name>Winston Chang</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>Also, another thing to keep in mind is that terminology on wall street isn't really based on the english meaning of the terms. So "derivatives" don't actually mean "anything that derives its value from something else". If it did, stocks would be considered derivatives, since their value is derived from the earnings (and eventually dividends) of the underlying company. It's like how the "finance division" at an investment bank means "accounting". When wall street talks about "derivatives", they're talking about a specific set of instruments, and MBSes/CDOs aren't not a part of that set, because the nature of how the instruments are priced, how volatile they are, are simply not at all similar to the group of instruments that are considered "derivatives." </p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-27T19:49:51Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.7009-comment:169427</id>
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		<title>Comment from williambanzai7 on 2009-03-29</title>
		<author>
				<name>williambanzai7</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
		<content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="">
				<![CDATA[<p>Its not the derivatives that are not my friends its the morons who trade them that are not my friends. With friends like AIG who needs enemies.</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-03-29T04:23:54Z</published>
	</entry>

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