And again, the administration seems to be rewriting the rules of capitalism to fashion a deal to its liking.
Purists -- and virtually every academic economist one happens to encounter -- wonder what happened to the once inviolate principle of rewarding risk-takers. Unsecured creditors will get less of a stake in the new GM than its employees, and you can forget about poor unadorned stockholders. (The administration promises some unspecified protections for creditors; we shall see.)
As in the deal with Chyrsler's bondholders, the administration muscled its way through the negotiations and used its considerable leverage to convince secured debtholders -- the highest class of investors -- to accept a fixed return that was significantly less than many of those investors had expected when they put money into the falling company. Who benefits? The question isn't very apt, because everyone is losing something. But, on balance, the unions are getting a better deal.
The unions, who support Democrats -- and whose work rules arguably hastened the collapse of the American auto industry.
Asked whether the Chrysler and GM bailouts were sops to unions at the expense of secured creditors, administration officials answer the subject of the question. That may be the case, they respond, but the other choices were untenable. As to the charge that the Obama economic team is redefining capitalism, erasing incentives for investors and acting like a gangster, I would wager an hour's worth of UAW productivity that officials, in private moments, would concede that these things are so. But they'd argue that, where critics see a contempt for capitalism, what's actually taking place is a revision of the informal rules that governed capitalism into the ground. A cultural revolution, if you will.
It is absolutely true that there are exigent circumstances; that the domino effect of two major auto company failures would cascade into a catastrophe even greater than the one we've experienced. The government's $15 billion stake in GM gives it actual leverage. At the same time, though, the Obama team is pushing a policy outcome that will advance Mr. Obama's economic worldview, one that treats the era of money capitalism, and all of its rules, as suspect.
The pattern is clear: threats from the government to abrogate employment contracts...public repudiation of the Wall Street bonus structure...proposals to change tax rates for corporations doing business overseas...the equating of hedge fund managers with "speculators," a term rife with history -- and a word that came out of the president's mouth during the frenzied Chrysler negotiations.
Note that, aside from threats and suasion, the administration hasn't done anything. The bondholders (with notable exceptions) agreed to these two deals. No laws have been broken. Everyone has sacrificed. And the unions have already given up a great deal -- and, in doing so, put their trust in the administration. Here's the Obama perspective on these deals, in six bullet points.
1. Secured debtholders were the blood cells of the money economy, and they're very important now. But employees ought to be valued by the market system, even if there is no way to measure their contribution. The Obama administration supports the union movement. Mr. Obama ran on a platform of empowering unions. This move empowers unions.
2. The administration believed that, absent tough talk, hedge funds and debt holders would have driven GM into bankruptcy; they'd get paid by, say, stripping down and melting the metal beams from the factories, and everyone else would get screwed. Incentives, in this case, would not have saved GM.
3. Chrysler, a much smaller company, might well have been left to die. But its failure at the time when the decision needed to be made -- its failure, in other words, in the context of a collapsing economy -- would have been much more catastrophic. The administration believes that its intervention will buy Chrysler a few more years. If it fails in a few years, that's bad -- but not destructive.
4. Unions aren't getting off scot free. They've got to reorganize the company. They're going to have to meet aggressive profit goals. They're now responsible for the legacy benefits. And investors aren't necessarily going to be willing to put money in GM now, especially given the precedents set by the government. The UAW may be on its own.
5. Here's a version of this argument, by private equity manager Scott Sperling:
"Far from harming capitalism, the Obama administration's policies concerning GM and Chrysler are very much in line with the process of "creative destruction" that the economist Joseph Schumpeter described as the active heart of capitalism's success. The government has been willing to support an important industry -- but only on the condition that all stakeholders make the tough choices necessary for the companies to succeed in the long term. This is capitalism at work."This argument may not buy Obama good will on Wall Street, but it faithfully represents what he's thinking.
Editor's note: A version of this column appeared on CBSNews.com











The problem with the Obama administration's approach and the quoted bit of idiocy from Sperling is not just that one interest group (debt investors) was harmed to benefit another politically faovred one (employees). The real issue is that the Obama administration has yet again used its considerable leverage to overturn settled expectations built on legal precedent, particularly in its treatment of secured creditors. Sure, Chrysler and GM lencers eventually agreed to the deal, but what choice did they have? Even the those of them that are not TARP beneficiaries knew that they could not assert their legal rights without being villified by Obama's press corps cheering section.
Obama is basically running rough-shod over the rule of law to benefit a favored political group. This is third world dictatorship stuff. Investors price in political risk in emerging markets, they generally do not in the developed economies like the US. Tragically, one of the few advantages that US manufacturers previously had over their emerging market competitors was the ability to obtain debt financing at rates that didn't reflect political risk. No longer. I know more than a couple of money managers who are explicitly avoiding any debt of companies with a large union employee base and/or demanding far higher yield from these companies for new financing. Obama may save GM and Chrysler temporarily, but the cost will be huge and may in the end destroy one of US manufacuring's last competetive advantages - the percieved stability and neutrality of US legal rules.
It's been said that European governments explicitly reward "insiders" at the expense of "outsiders". Reward current employees and retirees at the expense of the unemployed. Reward the older workers at the expense of new young workers. Reward citizens at the expense of immigrants, etc.
It seems these auto deals push us down the same road. That's the opposite of "creative destruction", where new entrants come into a market and push out the old ones.
After we've "saved" GM and Chysler, I can't see the government just shrugging and letting them fail in a few years. GM is "Government Motors" for the duration, until the taxpayer gets tired of it and lets them go, like the British did with Leyland. That could take a decade.
I think it's all a horrible precedent. I'm not sure if investors will run from these government-back monsters, or lend them money under the "too big to fail" assumption. I would think there's no room for a new free-market competitor though. Who would want to enter the U.S. market under these conditions?
I also wonder what Honda and Toyota think of this mess? Given their relative financial strength, I would guess they could lower the prices of their cars and just crush their American competition at this point. But they won't, due to the political considerations. So they are in a position of "make good cars, sell them at a good price, but not TOO good...." Kind of awkward.
Good post, Marc, I hope we see you here more often.
I sincerely hope that the US can acknowledge that it shouldn't be in the mass-manufacturing business much faster (and with less pain) than the UK http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Leyland
20 years of attrition is 20 years of wasted opportunity...