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	<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3/tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.19457-</id>
	<updated>2009-11-03T19:58:25Z</updated>
	<title>Comments for Brad DeLong is Wrong About the Banks</title>
	
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		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.19457</id>
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		<link rel="service.edit" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://business.theatlantic.com/mt-42/mt-atom.cgi/weblog/blog_id=3/entry_id=19457" title="Brad DeLong is Wrong About the Banks" />
		<published>2009-06-16T13:45:44Z</published>
		<updated>2009-06-16T14:02:37Z</updated>
		<title>Brad DeLong is Wrong About the Banks</title>
		<summary>Brad DeLong writes, Let&apos;s go through it slowly. The commercial banks were regulated. The government guaranteed their deposits. Savers who wanted to not have to worry about making sure that their money wasn&apos;t going to vanish and who were inertial...</summary>
		<author>
			<name>Arnold Kling</name>
			<uri>http://econlog.econlib.org</uri>
		</author>
		
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			<![CDATA[<a href="http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/06/the-atlantic-monthly-crashes-and-burns.html">Brad DeLong writes</a>, <br /><br /><blockquote>Let's go through it slowly. The commercial banks were regulated. The
government guaranteed their deposits. Savers who wanted to not have to
worry about making sure that their money wasn't going to vanish and who
were inertial in their behavior put their money into commercial banks.
Regulators watched the leverage of commercial banks. And commercial
banks--with their massive retail savings deposits--have for the most
part come through this all right.<br /></blockquote>The last sentence is not meant to be a joke.&nbsp; Yet it is far from reality-based.&nbsp; To the extent that the banks "came through" this, it is with a great deal of assistance from the taxpayers.<br />]]>
			<![CDATA[<br />He continues,<br /><br /><blockquote>The non-commercial banks--those that did not have large retail banking
deposits, did not have government guarantees, and were left less
tightly regulated--have, by contrast, flamed out almost to an entity
newly reincorporated as a bank holding company. Countrywide. Bear
Stearns. Other hot money-financed mortgage lenders too numerous to
name. Fannie Mae. Freddie Mac. Lehman. Merrill Lynch. AIG.<br /></blockquote>I
had no idea that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were part of the
unregulated "shadow banking system."&nbsp; Mark Thoma does not classify them
as such.&nbsp; Instead, he says that they "followed" the evil shadow bankers
into the den of subprime iniquity.&nbsp; Kind of like the kid who gets
caught with illicit substances 'cause he ran with the wrong crowd.<br /><br />Just
for the record, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were regulated.&nbsp; Maybe not
strongly enough (Congress was very good at emasculating their
regulator), but they were regulated.<br /><br />The position that the
financial system was brought down by the "shadow banking sector" is
widely held, particularly in Washington.&nbsp; However, it is not an
impregnable position.&nbsp; An alternative point of view is that there were
serious bank regulatory failures, and I encourage readers to check out <a href="http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20090411_7855.php">this piece in the National Journal</a> to see more specifics.<br /><br /><br /><b>From the Editors</b>: In the last few days, Atlantic Biz has taken on the issue of the shadow banking system and its role in the financial crisis, and created something of a fracas! The debate begins with Prof. Mark Thoma's Washington Post op-ed (<a href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/hearing/2009/06/banking_regulation_imposed_in.html?wprss=hearing">here</a>), which argued that the financial crisis began in the shadow banking system. Our Dr. Manhattan takes issue with that conclusion <a href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/06/sentences_that_dont_compute.php">here</a>. Prof. Thoma responds in the comments to say <i>it did too begin in shadow banking system</i> (and takes the fight back to his home blog <a href="http://economistsview.typepad.com/">here</a>). Prof. Brad DeLong tags in for Thoma and pulls no punches when he announces that "the Atlantic Monthly crashes and burns" <a href="http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/06/the-atlantic-monthly-crashes-and-burns.html">here</a>. Charles Davi emerges from the flames <a href="http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/06/the_shadow_banking_system_did_not_cause_this_crisis.php">here</a> to state unequivocally that the shadow banking system did not cause the financial crisis.<br /><br /><br />]]>
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	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.19457-comment:210411</id>
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		<title>Comment from ATL Hoya on 2009-06-16</title>
		<author>
				<name>ATL Hoya</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
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				<![CDATA[<p>Also for the record, Countrywide had a bank (Countrywide Bank, N.A.) first regulated by the OCC and then by the OTS following a thrift conversion:</p>

<p><a href="http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/InstitutionHistory.aspx?parID_RSSD=1469211&parDT_END=99991231">http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/InstitutionHistory.aspx?parID_RSSD=1469211&parDT_END=99991231</a></p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-06-16T14:52:48Z</published>
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	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.19457-comment:210764</id>
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		<title>Comment from Alex S on 2009-06-16</title>
		<author>
				<name>Alex S</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
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				<![CDATA[<p>Fannie and Freddie were unregulated?  Who knew?  That must come as some news to FHFA, which is a regulator *solely for Fannie and Freddie*.</p>

<p>In any case, I guess Prof DeLong overlooks Citi, BofA, WaMu, IndyMac, etc., etc.  Apparently, to Prof. DeLong, these "traditional" banks are all doing just fine, right!?</p>

<p>Moreover, as noted above Countrywide had a bank and was regulated by banking regulators.  And the same goes for AIG - AIG was not part of the "unregulated shadow banking system".  AIG's financial products <a href="http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Extra/was-aig-watchdog-not-up-to-the-job.aspx">were in fact regulated, by US banking regulators at OTS</a>.  It's just that OTS did a crappy job of regulation.</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-06-16T22:59:36Z</published>
	</entry>

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