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Jun 1 2009, 10:10 am
What's Good for GM Isn't What's Good For America
So. Alea iacta est, as Julius Caesar might have said, if there had been a major Roman chariot manufacturer in putative need of nationalization. The nation's largest automaker, our most iconic firm, is bankrupt, GM and Citigroup exit the Dow in favor of Travelers and Cisco.
The first obvious thing to say is that the only alternative the US government probably had to this massively expensive reorganization was probably liquidation. I take seriously the claims that there was no DIP financing available for the automakers.
However. The reason there was no DIP financing available is, at least in part, that there's no obvious upside here. The government is acting as if GM's main problem is that it stubbornly refused to enter the lucrative market for small, fuel-efficient cars. But the market for small, fuel efficient cars is not lucrative--they're the cars with the thinnest margins. And no one's making it up on volume, either: at the height of last year's oil spike, when barrels of Brent Crude were being quoted in first-born sons, small cars soared to . . . 20% of the American market. Yes, there was a glut of SUVs, but that's because American companies were making a lot of SUVs. Foreign companies make money on small cars because they develop them for lucrative home markets before modifying them for American production.
GM's main problem is not that the market is unreasonably unwilling to finance a potentially profitable company. Nor that it can't produce an awesome small car that shockingly few people want to buy. (Believe me, as the owner of a tiny, ultra-efficient car, I would that there were higher demand for my rapidly depreciating asset). GM's main problems are
1) A terrible, bloated cost structure
2) A terrible, bloated bureaucracy
3) A bunch of meh car lines
Which of these is the government going to solve? That terrible, bloated cost structure supports a bloated union whose jobs are the entire rationale for the government intervention. Leaning on the parts suppliers just risks UAW jobs further down the supply chain. Maybe we can take it out of the budget for copy paper and pencils.
Forgive me if I am skeptical that the government is going to show GM how to streamline its bureaucracy. Nor do governments historically have a good record as cutting-edge auto designers.
All the government can give GM is money. Our money. Perhaps we should change the name to American Leyland.
The first obvious thing to say is that the only alternative the US government probably had to this massively expensive reorganization was probably liquidation. I take seriously the claims that there was no DIP financing available for the automakers.
However. The reason there was no DIP financing available is, at least in part, that there's no obvious upside here. The government is acting as if GM's main problem is that it stubbornly refused to enter the lucrative market for small, fuel-efficient cars. But the market for small, fuel efficient cars is not lucrative--they're the cars with the thinnest margins. And no one's making it up on volume, either: at the height of last year's oil spike, when barrels of Brent Crude were being quoted in first-born sons, small cars soared to . . . 20% of the American market. Yes, there was a glut of SUVs, but that's because American companies were making a lot of SUVs. Foreign companies make money on small cars because they develop them for lucrative home markets before modifying them for American production.
GM's main problem is not that the market is unreasonably unwilling to finance a potentially profitable company. Nor that it can't produce an awesome small car that shockingly few people want to buy. (Believe me, as the owner of a tiny, ultra-efficient car, I would that there were higher demand for my rapidly depreciating asset). GM's main problems are
1) A terrible, bloated cost structure
2) A terrible, bloated bureaucracy
3) A bunch of meh car lines
Which of these is the government going to solve? That terrible, bloated cost structure supports a bloated union whose jobs are the entire rationale for the government intervention. Leaning on the parts suppliers just risks UAW jobs further down the supply chain. Maybe we can take it out of the budget for copy paper and pencils.
Forgive me if I am skeptical that the government is going to show GM how to streamline its bureaucracy. Nor do governments historically have a good record as cutting-edge auto designers.
All the government can give GM is money. Our money. Perhaps we should change the name to American Leyland.










One thing that Megan doesn't address is that GM is really a reasonably successful truck company that also sells cars. The last time I checked the Silverado was one of the top 5 selling vehicles (not just trucks) in the country. People will need and use pickup trucks whether gas is $2, $3, or $4 a gallon. Even if gas goes higher, GM has hybrid trucks that get decent gas mileage.
If GM downsized to Chevy and Cadillac, it would likely be a profitable company. I suspect that Washington does not want see GM downsize (and reduce employment) so drastically so fast (although it'll be coming close in any case), nor does it want to see it focus on what it does well and makes money on, trucks, because of the environmental issues.
I'm curious as to why Megan doesn't think GM has done much to reduce its bureaucracy and/or cost structure. The white collar workforce has been downsized dramatically (as one who lives in Michigan I can confirm this from first-hand knowledge), and the union has agreed that new hires (few as they may be) will get about 1/2 of the hourly wage they used to make and that healthcare will be transferred to a VEBA.
I think that when the economic crisis starts to alleviate and people can get loans, GM will be fine -- smaller but fine -- that the government loans will be paid back.
It is a pity that the very long drawn out, very expensive wreck of the British owned car manufacturers had such un-memorable names attached to it. With luck, the world will learn more from the collapse of GM; don't change the name at this stage.
One relevant lesson from Britain is that the British governemnt people simply could not comprehend the depth of ingrained,thoroughgoing and incurable incompetence of the British car manufacturers. So they pumped in money time after time on the assumption that the incoming management could not do as bad a job as the outging idiots. They did.
My guess is that the supply of self-confident incompetents who genuinely and fiercely believe that experience in Detroit auto manufacturing fits them to save GM/Chrysler/Ford is both more ample and more plausible than was the equivalent supply in Britain. If the US government believes them, the last years of Detroit are going to be more than proportionately more costly than the last years of "British" car manufacture.
The other relevant lesson is that Britain now produces a surprising quantity of saleable vehicles - courtesy of competent auto manufacturers from Japan, Germany etc.