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	<updated>2009-11-03T19:56:46Z</updated>
	<title>Comments for <![CDATA[What Does &quot;Too Big to Fail&quot; Mean Anymore?]]></title>
	
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		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.21505</id>
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		<published>2009-07-17T14:59:57Z</published>
		<updated>2009-08-13T15:01:15Z</updated>
		<title>What Does &quot;Too Big to Fail&quot; Mean Anymore?</title>
		<summary>Simon Johnson, a former IMF economist, has a piece on his Baseline Scenario blog today about former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson&apos;s testimony to Congress yesterday, which he ties into the larger story of how we let a handful of banks...</summary>
		<author>
			<name>Derek Thompson</name>
			<uri>http://www.theatlantic.com/</uri>
		</author>
		
		<category term="BofA" />
		
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			<![CDATA[Simon Johnson, a former IMF economist, has <a href="http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/17/who-nationalized-whom/">a piece</a> on his Baseline Scenario blog today about former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's testimony to Congress yesterday, which he ties into the larger story of how we let a handful of banks control such a formidable swath of our financial system. Even as we collectively intoned the lesson <i>Too Big to Fail is Bad, Too Big to Fail is Bad</i>, we're seen Countrywide Financial, the mortgage lending giant, and Merrill Lynch swallowed by Bank of America, while JP MorganChase absorbed Bear Sterns and Washington Mutual. And we didn't just allow this to happen. At times, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-20090715-PaulsonTestimony.pdf">we forced it to happen.</a><br /><br />As a result, we've avoided government nationalization at the expense of basically allowing JP Morgan and Bank of America to nationalize the banks for us.<br />]]>
			<![CDATA[<br />Why is that important? Because it puts the future of bank regulation
in an awkward spot: 1) We're allowed these BofA and JPMorgan to get Way
Too Big to Fail; 2) Now that both banks are reporting quarterly
profits, they'll be untethered to government assistance for the
conceivable future; and yet 3) These giants, and Goldman Sachs, know
that if profits do slump in the case of a double-dip recession, the
government has to leap in because they are, definitionally, Way Too Big
to Fail.<br />
<br />
The solution to this conundrum, as outlined by Obama's Financial
Regulatory Reform plan in June, is to hold huge banks to strict capital
standards and charge the Federal Reserve with keeping a watchful eye on
their leveraging. The administration allegedly hopes that this will
convince firms to downsize or at least mitigate their risk-taking, to
avoid another September 2008.<br />
<br />
But, as Tim Fernholz <a href="http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=who_regulates_the_regulators">notes</a>, dampening risk-taking is another way of saying <i>dampening profits</i>.
Even as they emerge from a recession, we will be asking banks to
sacrifice revenue to protect them from themselves. Our TBTF banking
system will come to resemble that favorite metaphor of prudent
restraint from Fareed Zakaria, in which the noble Ulysses asks his men
to bind him to the shipmast to keep him from heeding the Sirens' call
to run his boat into the rocky cliffs.<br />
<br />
This brings me back to the Paulson testimony yesterday, in which he
admitted to threatening BofA CEO Ken Lewis not to back out of the
Merrill merger. Now that BofA is way TBTF, will it descend on a
reformist-minded Washington and pursuasively argue that the government
is essentially punishing Bank of America for listening to Hank Paulson?
The animating philosophy behind the government's bank plan has been:
Save the big banks, by any means necessasry. Is anybody in the
government really prepared to look Wall Street in the face and say: We
need you to make less money?<br />]]>
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	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.21505-comment:227570</id>
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		<title>Comment from Diversity on 2009-07-17</title>
		<author>
				<name>Diversity</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
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				<![CDATA[<p>Heck, I thought that the Bernacke-Obama game plan was to let the big banks make all the money they want; just charge them a compulsory insurance premium for the risk their bigness imposes on the tax-payer. Since we are fiercely in favour of free markets, that premium needs to be big enough to ensure that all the possible costs their TBTF staus may impose on the public purse are covered in advance. Anything less would be evil government intervention; and would leave a big hole in the plans to correct the public sector deficit.</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-07-17T16:30:25Z</published>
	</entry>

	<entry>
		<id>tag:business.theatlantic.com,2009://3.21505-comment:228494</id>
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		<title>Comment from Peter Salmon on 2009-07-19</title>
		<author>
				<name>Peter Salmon</name>
				<uri></uri>
		</author>
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				<![CDATA[<p>I think that by bailing out AIG we allowed the emergence of a category of financial institution in the USA and UK in particular that became even bigger and thus ever harder to allow to fail.</p>

<p>We are seeing now with big profits being announced by Goldmans and J P Morgan that the wheel is beginning to turn yet again in the cycle.</p>

<p>We have, perhaps inadvertently, made a rod for our own backs in the longer term. I wrote about some aspects of this here <a href="http://bit.ly/10iVx2">http://bit.ly/10iVx2</a> and in that post I referenced some possible approaches to remedies by Willem Buiter and Lord Lawson.</p>

<p>However, 20/20 hindsight is of course a great thing</p>]]>
		</content>
		<published>2009-07-20T01:08:36Z</published>
	</entry>

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