Three economists, John Cogan, John Taylor and Volker Wieland, co-authored an opinion piece in today's Wall Street Journal with a headline boldly proclaiming: "The Stimulus Didn't Work." Their argument essentially says that their neoclassical economic models were right, and those silly Keynesians were wrong. They go through a few empirical data points to show just how little the stimulus did. While I'm sympathetic to most of their reasoning, I worry they're missing something very key about human psychology that should be considered.
First, they look at the stimulus' effect on consumption. They say that there was none, relying on this chart:

The blue line represents the disposable personal income of Americans. Those two spikes you see are stimulus payments. The first is from Bush's 2008 stimulus payments; the second is from Obama and Congress' much smaller payments. The red line is consumption. As you can see there are no similar spikes in red. Here's what they say:
This is exactly what one would expect from "permanent income" or "life-cycle" theories of consumption, which argue that temporary changes in income have little effect on consumption. These theories were developed by Milton Friedman and Franco Modigliani 50 years ago, and have been empirically tested many times. They are much more accurate than simple Keynesian theories of consumption, so the lack of an impact should not be surprising.
They go on to prove their bipartisanship by saying: and by the way -- look -- the Bush stimulus payments had the same spectacularly negligible effect on consumption! And they're right. That temporary payments don't change consumption patterns is widely accepted economic fact. Unfortunately, it's little known to politicians in Washington.
Yet this money must be going somewhere, so where is it going? Maybe it's being used to pay down debt; maybe it's being used for investment; or maybe it's just being saved. I would argue that, though not consumption, those are still actions that ultimately help a stumbling economy get a little healthier. Having more money in your pocket certainly makes you feel better, and consumer sentiment matters a lot during a recession, even if that doesn't translate to immediate consumption. Maybe people would have saved even more and spent even less without the payments, for example.
Next, the authors investigate how the stimulus affected the 5.4% increase in GDP from the first to second quarter. They attribute this mostly to the 5.8% increase in private business investment in plants, equipment and inventories. Here's their explanation of why the stimulus must not have had anything to do with that:
One is hard put to see what specific items in the stimulus act could have arrested the decline in business investment by such a magnitude. When one looks at monthly investment indicators--such as new orders for nondefense capital goods--one sees a flattening out starting early in the first quarter of 2009, well before the package went into operation. The free fall of investment orders caused by the financial panic last fall stabilized substantially by January, and investment has remained relatively stable since then. This created the residue of a very large negative growth rate from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, and then moderation from the first quarter to the second of 2009. There is no plausible role for the fiscal stimulus here.
Again, I generally agree with them on the quantitative reality of these facts. But there's still some psychology here behind why businesses were comfortable ramping up investment. Even if you believe that it had nothing to do with stimulus funds reaching the private sector, then there could still be an intangible effect here. Perhaps knowing that the government was throwing $787 billion at the economy in order try to reduce the pain of the recession helped the sentiment of business as well. Maybe businesses decided that the economy can't possibly continue to suffer given such extraordinary government intervention, so built more plants, ordered more equipment and ramped up inventories in the hopes of imminent recovery built on that government action.
Now don't get me wrong: I'm not really disagreeing with the central thesis of this essay. I fear that the stimulus probably did far less than the Democrats in Washington would like to believe. But I also think it borders on absurd to say that it did nothing. Psychology is relevant in economics. So even if people believed that the government's efforts would stimulate the economy, then that is something -- even if it is something of a placebo effect. Was it worth the $787 billion cost? Would a smaller stimulus have failed to accomplish largely the same result? Those are completely separate questions, both of which I'd feel much less comfortable arguing in the affirmative.










September 2008 to September 2009, the federal government ran a deficit of just over $2 trillion. That money, not the official "stimulus" went somewhere in the economy. See U.S. Treasury site "Debt to the penny" for the numbers.
Some of that made up for missing tax revenue and kept government from cutting spending. Some of it went to various bailouts. The bulk went into real estate. The federal government is basically providing the entire mortgage market for the U.S. at this point.
I'd look to that effect, not any subtle psychology, to explain why the economy has paused on its way down.
This is not a real increase in wealth however. The government is grabbing the credit card out of your wallet, putting a cash advance on it, then handing you the money like it was a gift. Feel better?
I agree with you in the following way:
1) The stimulus, as govt borrowing, is an aid to QE by pushing up long term inflation rates
2) The infrastructure spending employs people, trying to keep it from going to the moon
3) The infrastructure spending shows the govt investing in the future
4) The infrastructure spending can be well spent
5) Cash to people in many cases is part of the attempt to keep up the social safety net
Along with a general placebo effect, the attempt here is to alter expectations about the future of the economy. The world looks very different if you're viewing it through inflation expectations rather than deflation expectations. Some people, of course, believe that monetary policy can do this in ZIRP, while others don't. I like govt borrowing because it aides QE by altering expectations. However, I would have preferred a more incentivized approach, like a Sales Tax Holiday or Dated Coupon. But, as a political compromise, this plan was fine.
No, of course the stimulus didn't work.
We just avoided a Depression, the real estate market in cities like Dallas is turning around, consumer spending is slightly rising, and the stock market is going up, just on its own. It's just magic.
What a miracle! Praise God.
The psychological point and the point about paying down debt is good, but you ultimately really let Cogan, Taylor, and Wieland off the hook.
No Keynesian in their right mind doesn't accept some version of life cycle consumption theories any more. That's EXACTLY why Democrats OPPOSED the direct stimulus payments and tax cuts in the stimulus package. Back in January and February it was people like Krugman and DeLong that were citing Friedman and Modigliani to make exactly this point. And because Republicans in Washington probably haven't read a page of Friedman or Modigliani they completely ignored it and Democrats had to accept a compromise bill. One wonders where Cogan, Taylor, and Wieland were when this stimulus was passed.
What Cogan, Taylor, and Wieland DON'T address are the direct government spending provisions, which New Keynesians (with the advantage over the old Cambridge don of actually having Friedman available to draw on) have ALWAYS argued would be the more stimulative part of the package. And of course that wouldn't show up in consumption, it would show up in government spending.
Cogan, Taylor, and Wieland are right as far as they go - but they aren't really disagreeing with the Keynesians and they're essentially talking past the most important part of the conversation!
They hit consumption and investment and I think make great cases for why those haven't been substantially impacted by the stimulus.
So what has buoyed GDP? What's the last piece of the puzzle??? BINGO! Government spending. Government investment. Of course you don't see a change in consumption or investment. The whole point of the Keynesian argument is that you won't see a change in consumption or investment, which is exactly why government spending needs to step in.
Granted, the 5.4% drop is implausible to attribute to the stimulus - I'm not saying that. I think that has more to do with the work of Ben Bernanke.
BUT the point is, Cogan, Taylor, and Wieland make a VERY flimsy case against real Keynesian stimulus.
Daniel, both of your comments are persuasive. I remember reading Krugman back then and that's how I remember it too.
The only thing I'm confused about is "the 5.4% drop is implausible to attribute to the stimulus". All I see in the article above is the citation of a 5.4% gain in GDP. Does that result in a corresponding 5.4% drop in something else? Or was that a typo?
Troy -
Sorry, typo. That's what I meant.
Or I can cover my ass and say that I was talking about a 5.4% drop in the output gap, but then again I think that would be a fairly unconvincing attempt at a save :)
I'm a little more firm than you, I believe that ~$800,000,000,000 should definitely, positively, not be spent on the barely articulable notion that psychological outcomes will be approved.
I even disagree on the premise: when DC politicians started running around like teenage girls without a prom date and throwing up enormous plans to save the economy, it scared & confused people & businesses and created negative psychological outcomes.
Recall that broad surveys of economists predicted a recovery by early 2009 from the 2008 financial crisis, but the D.C.-based reaction created nutty expectations of depression like those of LoneStar above. I'd say the threats behind TARP and the Stimulus made things worse on the psychological front.